The Costs and Benefits of Price Stability by Martin Feldstein
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Costs and Benefits of Price Stability
Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-24099-1
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/feld99-1
Publication Date: January 1999
Chapter Title: Introduction to "Costs and Benefits of Price Stability, The"
Chapter Author: Martin Feldstein
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7769
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 8)Introduction 
Martin Feldstein 
During the past decade, the United States and most of the countries of western 
Europe have experienced substantial declines in their rates of inflation. Since 
1992, the annual rates of increase of consumer prices in the United States have 
been 3 percent or less. Inflation rates in many European countries and in Japan 
have been even lower. 
But low inflation is not the same as price stability. The Federal Reserve and 
other central banks repeatedly state that “price stability” is their goal. Even 
allowing for measurement bias in the official inflation statistics, price stability 
would require a U.S. inflation rate as measured by  the consumer price index 
(CPI) of  1 or 2 percent. 
The  issue for the Federal Reserve and  other central banks is therefore 
whether to take steps to lower inflation even more until full price stability is 
achieved. Similarly, the central banks face the question of how to respond if 
an adverse price shock should raise the inflation rate from current levels to, 
say, 3.5 or 4 percent. 
In keeping with our NBER tradition, the papers in this volume do not offer 
specific policy advice. Our goal is rather to provide information that can help 
policy officials at the Federal Reserve and others who are interested in this 
question to reach a more informed decision.’ 
There are of  course many ways in which going from low inflation to full 
price stability confers benefits on an economy. The primary focus of the pres- 
ent volume is on the gains that would result from price stability because of the 
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interaction between inflation and the tax system. Even in the absence of infla- 
tion, the tax systems of the United States and western Europe cause losses of 
economic efficiency by distorting individuals’ choices between current and fu- 
ture consumption and by inducing overinvestment in owner-occupied housing. 
These tax distortions are exacerbated by inflation; the higher the rate of infla- 
tion, the greater the tax bias against future consumption and the greater the tax 
bias in favor of  owner-occupied housing. Because inflation increases the ex- 
isting tax distortions, the resulting welfare loss from even low rates of inflation 
can be quite substantial. More formally, the deadweight losses that result from 
inflation are not just “small triangles” (i.e., second-order effects) but are poten- 
tially much larger “trapezoids” (i.e., first-order losses of economic welfare). 
The welfare gain from reducing the rate of  inflation is a permanent one. 
Indeed, because the welfare loss caused by inflation is proportional to the level 
of GDP, the annual welfare gain from reducing inflation grows over time in 
proportion to the growing level of GDP. In contrast, standard economic theory 
implies that the cost of going from low inflation to price stability is the tempo- 
rary cost of moving down the short-run Phillips curve. Because of this contrast 
between the permanent gain and a temporary loss, even a relatively large tem- 
porary output loss incurred to reduce inflation can be more than offset by the 
present value of the permanent and growing gain of lower inflation. 
I first explored this contrast between the short-run cost of  disinflation and 
the permanent gain of lower inflation in a paper that focused just on the re- 
duced distortion in the demand for money (Feldstein 1979). That paper empha- 
sized that although the annual welfare gains from reducing the distortion in the 
demand for money are very small, they can be enough to justify a large cost 
of disinflation if  the discount rate used to calculate the present value of the 
future welfare gains is low enough. 
Although I had written extensively on the interaction of taxes and inflation,* 
it was only in  1996, as part of an NBER project organized by  Christina and 
David Romer, that I presented an analysis based on that research to evaluate 
the welfare gain that would result from going from low inflation to price stabil- 
ity (see Feldstein 1997a). I found there that the gain associated with the tax- 
inflation interaction is very much larger then the potential gain from reducing 
the distortion in money demand. I estimated that going from a 2 percent rate 
of  inflation to price stability raises annual economic welfare by  an amount 
equal to about a 1 percent rise in real GDP. Even with a relatively high real 
discount rate, the present value of this permanent and growing stream of wel- 
fare gains could substantially outweigh the output loss required to go from low 
inflation to price stability. 
This finding raised the important question of whether this relatively large 
welfare gain from moving to price stability is a special feature of the U.S. tax 
system or whether it would occur in other industrial countries, each with its 
2. See my papers on this subject collected in Feldstein (1983). 3  Introduction 
own tax rules. If the potential tax-inflation gain that I had calculated is unique 
to the United States, it might be possible to achieve the same gain by shifting 
the U.S. tax system in the direction of the tax systems of other major countries. 
But if the tax-inflation interaction is a source of significant welfare loss in all 
countries, the prospect of limiting that loss by feasible tax reforms would be 
less promising. The potential gain from going from low inflation to price sta- 
bility in other countries would of  course also be important to the monetary 
authorities of those countries. 
To explore this issue, I invited the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Spain, 
and the Bank of England to participate in an NBER project to refine and repli- 
cate my earlier analysis. The results of our combined efforts are presented in 
the first four chapters of  this volume. These results show that differences in 
national tax rules do cause differences in the gain from disinflation but that 
in each country there would be a significant gain from shifhng from 2 percent 
inflation to full price stability. 
In their analysis of the German economy, Karl-Heinz Todter and Gerhard 
Ziebarth found that the gain from reducing inflation by  2 percentage points 
was equivalent to a perpetuity of  1.4 percent of GDP, about 40 percent greater 
than the basic estimate for the United States. The difference is concentrated in 
the effect of  the inflation-tax interaction on the timing of  consumption. Al- 
though the complex differences between U.S. and German laws make it diffi- 
cult to pinpoint the reason for the difference in welfare effects, I suspect that 
it is the higher marginal rate of tax in the German case that is the primary rea- 
son for the difference. 
The Spanish analysis by Dolado, Gonzilez-Pkamo, and Viiials also found 
a larger gain from achieving price stability than the U.S. numbers imply. Their 
calculations imply that the gain from a 2 percentage point inflation reduction 
would be about 1.7 percent of  GDP, about 70 percent more than the estimate 
for the United States. The principal source of the difference is the much higher 
deadweight loss associated with the increased demand for housing in Spain. 
According to those authors, this reflects the fact that in Spain the tax privileges 
associated with owner-occupied housing are quite generous and the size of the 
housing stock is also relatively large. 
While the calculations for Britain also show a significant gain from reducing 
inflation, the gain is very much less than in the other countries, only about one- 
fifth of the U.S. value, or about 0.2 percent of GDP a year. This lower level of 
loss reflects the substantial differences between the tax systems of the United 
Kingdom and the other countries, particularly the ways in which U.K. investors 
can reduce the tax on investment income and the limited tax advantage of home 
mortgages. Britain indexes capital gains for inflation, eliminating one signifi- 
cant source of the tax-inflation interaction that penalizes postponed consump- 
tion. There are also many more opportunities for middle and upper income 
individuals to save in untaxed forms in Britain, implying that the tax-inflation 
interaction does not distort the timing of  consumption for these individuals. 4  Martin Feldstein 
Finally, deductible mortgage borrowing is much more limited in Britain, reduc- 
ing the effect of inflation on the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing.7 
My 1996 analysis had several potentially important omissions. Two of these 
gaps have been filled by  papers in the current volume. Darrel Cohen, Kevin 
Hassett, and Glenn Hubbard have studied the effect of inflation on the net-of- 
tax profitability of different kinds of business assets: equipment versus struc- 
tures and short-lived assets versus long-lived assets. They find that inflation 
raises the user cost of capital, thus exacerbating the distortion that the tax sys- 
tem would cause in the absence of inflation, but that the magnitude of the effect 
and the resulting welfare consequence are very small. 
Mihir Desai and James Hines filled the second gap by extending the earlier 
analysis to an open economy with international capital flows. They show that 
in this context the tax-inflation interaction distorts international capital flows 
and that this extra dimension of  behavior can cause the gain from achieving 
price stability to be substantially larger than it would be in a closed economy. 
In an important case that they examine, the gain from price stability would be 
about twice as large as it would be in a closed economy. 
There are two further interrelated tax-inflation issues that remain to be ex- 
amined: the effect of inflation on the debt-equity mix of household portfolios 
(since inflation raises the tax on debt relative to the tax on equity) and the 
effect of inflation on the financing mix of firms (since inflation lowers the cost 
of debt finance relative to the cost of equity finance). Although neither of these 
welfare effects is likely to be of  the same order of magnitude as the issues 
assessed in the analyses that have been done, it would be desirable to explore 
these additional questions. 
A more fundamental issue is the assumption that a shift to price stability 
changes the level of real GDP (including the change in deadweight losses) but 
does not alter the economy’s rate of  economic growth. There is substantial 
evidence that high rates of inflation (exceeding 10 percent per year) do reduce 
economic growth (Barro 1995; Bruno and Easterly 1995; Fischer 1993; Sarel 
1996), but those studies have found no evidence that single-digit rates of infla- 
tion permanently affect the rate of economic growth. The paper in this volume 
by Andrks and Hernando analyzes the experience of OECD countries during a 
period of relatively low inflation and finds that even low inflation has an impor- 
tant negative temporary effect on the long-term growth rate; that is, it perma- 
nently lowers the level of real incomes (by reducing investment and the effi- 
ciency with which factor inputs are used). Their careful econometric analysis 
suggests that reducing the permanent rate of inflation by  1 percentage point 
3.  Although the study has been done with great care and attention to the details of the British 
tax  system, there are  unresolved issues  about just how much of the favorable tax  treatment of 
saving affects marginal saving. Because the saving incentives are subject to  limits, many individu- 
als may face the full tax  rate at  the  margin even though they  face lower average tax  rates on 
investment income. Since the welfare effects depend on the marginal tax rates, the impact of lower 
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would permanently raise the level of real income by between 0.5 and 2.0 per- 
cent. This finding that there is a level effect but not a rate-of-growth effect is 
consistent with the assumption made in the analyses in the other papers. Al- 
though the AndrCs-Hemando estimate seems substantially larger than the esti- 
mates obtained in the four country studies, it is important to bear in mind that 
they are looking at the level of  income and not at the change in economic 
welfare. If each generation of individuals saves more when they are young, the 
capital stock will be permanently larger and real incomes higher. The utility 
gains to the individuals will, however, be less than the rise in income since 
they have accepted lower levels of consumption during their younger years to 
achieve this. 
The studies in this volume also assume that the shift to price stability re- 
quires a temporary  rise in unemployment but that price  stability, once it is 
achieved, can be sustained without a permanently  higher rate of unemploy- 
ment, that is, that there is a short-run Phillips curve but that the long-run Phil- 
lips curve is vertical. This long-established conclusion about the nature of the 
inflation-unemployment  relation  has  recently  been  challenged  by Akerlof, 
Dickens, and Perry  (1996), who believe that a downward-sloping  long-run 
Phillips curve (associating higher unemployment with lower inflation) exists 
at very low rates of inflation because of the difficulty of achieving reductions 
in nominal wages. The essence of their argument is that the reductions in real 
wages for particular employees or firms that are occasionally needed to main- 
tain employment can be achieved by reducing the rate of increase of nominal 
wages when there is moderate inflation but cannot be achieved when there is 
price stability because such real wage cuts would require lowering the level of 
nominal wages. 
Since the United States has not yet experienced price stability, there is no 
way to test this directly. It is clear, however, that the recent experience with 
very low inflation provides no support for the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry  view 
since very low inflation has been accompanied by low and declining rates of 
unemployment; in the five years since the rate of CPI inflation fell to 3 percent 
or less (i.e., since 1992) the unemployment rate has fallen from 7.5 percent to 
less than 5.0 per~ent.~  One possible reason for this favorable relation  is the 
finding of Groshen and Schweitzer (in chap. 7 of this volume) that reducing 
inflation decreases the kind of wage variability that makes labor markets less 
efficient at matching jobs and job seekers. 
My own view is that the resistance to nominal wage reductions would gradu- 
4. This experience  should also raise questions about the possible importance of  “hysteresis 
effects” in this context, i.e., the proposition that a “temporarily” higher rate of unemployment will 
become permanently higher because unemployment causes workers to lose their skills and their 
commitment to work. While this may be relevant in the context of Europe’s high rates of unem- 
ployment and very long unemployment spells, in the United States with our much lower rates of 
unemployment and much shorter unemployment spells hysteresis effects seem much less likely a 
priori and are clearly not supported by the experience after the recession that ended in 1991. 6  Martin Feldstein 
ally disappear in a sustained period of price stability as such changes become 
more common. In addition, the current tendency to make bonuses a part of 
annual compensation even for lower paid workers provides a way of reducing 
total compensation by cutting the bonus without the psychologically more dif- 
ficult action of reducing the individual’s official wage rate. 
There are of  course other advantages of price stability that have not been 
explored in this volume. Price stability may  bring a “credibility bonus” that 
allows the monetary authority to offset adverse inflation shocks with less loss 
of output. Price stability also makes financial planning easier, even for appar- 
ently sophisticated financial investors. These issues are discussed briefly in my 
own chapter in this volume. 
Because of  the importance of  the tax-inflation interaction as a source of 
welfare loss, some participants in the conference suggested that the gain from 
price stability could be achieved by changing the tax law instead of by reducing 
inflation. Although the proposals for “fundamental tax  reform” that would 
completely eliminate the personal and corporate income taxes and substitute 
taxes on wages or consumption would eliminate the distorting effects of infla- 
tion, such tax rules have  not been enacted anywhere in the world and now 
show no sign of being adopted in the United States. Indexing all aspects of the 
measurement of taxable income (including capital gains, interest payments and 
receipts, and depreciation) for inflation would be another way  to eliminate 
the current distorting effects of  the tax-inflation interaction. But it is again 
noteworthy that no major industrial country has adopted such inde~ing.~  In 
Feldstein (1997a, sec. 3.8) I discuss the technical, legal, and administrative 
reasons that are likely to prevent such comprehensive tax indexing from ever 
being enacted. 
In any case, the Federal Reserve (and every other central bank) must decide 
how to conduct monetary policy and what inflation rate to seek. It does not 
have the option of changing the structure of the tax system. While economists 
may offer advice about ways in which the economy’s performance can be im- 
proved by changes in labor market institutions, social insurance rules, and tax 
regulations, the central bank must make monetary policy in the institutional 
context that it finds. 
There is finally the question of whether a negative rate of inflation would be 
better than price stability. The logic of the tax-inflation calculation implies that 
the welfare gain that would result from going from low inflation to price stabil- 
ity would be increased further by going to a negative inflation rate. Deciding 
whether that would be a desirable goal in practice would require balancing 
such tax-inflation gains against not only the costs associated with getting to 
5.  Although the influential chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee has long been 
an advocate of  indexing capital gains and succeeded in getting such a provision incorporated into 
the 1997 tax bill passed by the House of Representatives, the strong opposition of the White House 
and the lack of  strong support among Senate Republicans kept it from becoming part of the final 
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such a rate of disinflation but also the effect of  a negative inflation rate on 
the quality of  individual decision making, on the “credibility bonus” usually 
associated with price stability, and on the possible psychological effect of dis- 
inflation on managers and other investors. 
For the past several years, the U.S. economy has been enjoying a remarkable 
combination of low inflation and low unemployment. There is clearly no public 
or political support at this time for a deliberate policy to increase the unem- 
ployment rate in order to reduce further the rate of inflation. Similarly, there is 
no support for a policy of deliberately raising the inflation rate in order to 
reduce unemployment. The Federal Reserve must nevertheless continue to fo- 
cus on setting a goal for the long-term rate of inflation. More specifically, the 
members of the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee should be asking 
themselves three kinds of questions, listed here in what may be the order of 
increasing difficulty: First, how should the Federal Reserve respond if  some 
nonmonetary force causes a rise in inflation? Second, how should it respond if 
economic activity slows, pointing to a rise in unemployment and a further de- 
cline in inflation? And, third, what risk of excess tightening and resulting eco- 
nomic decline should the Federal Reserve be willing to take as it contemplates 
the probability that the current low rate of unemployment (now 4.9 percent) is 
below the level that is consistent with stable inflation? I hope that the studies 
presented in this volume will help the Federal Reserve (as well as other central 
banks) to deal with these questions. 
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